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I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1997 decision, State v. George,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court in-
tended to send the message that it is moving beyond the United States
Supreme Court's totality of the circumstances test to heightened appel-
late review of consent searches in an attempt to ensure the voluntariness
of consent, particularly in traffic stop situations. The question is whether
practitioners are receiving the message. It is in the best interests of prose-
cutors and law enforcement officers to consider the direction the court is
heading in the area of consent searches.
1. 557 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. 1997).
2. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27, 233, 248-49 (1973).
See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text for further discussion of Schneckloth.
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This Note analyzes the future of consent searches in Minnesota. Part
II of this Note examines the development of consent searches as an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and as an invaluable
tool in law enforcement. It also reviews how the United States Supreme
Court views consent searches, how other states approach consent searches
in light of the Supreme Court's views, and how the Minnesota Supreme
Court dealt with consent searches prior to its decision in George. Part III
then closely examines the facts and the majority and concurring opinions
in George. In Part IV, this Note highlights the currently unclear standard
for consent searches. Part IV then argues that George indicates that in the
near future the Minnesota Supreme Court is likely to raise the require-
ments for valid consent searches and advocates that the best option for
the court is to require that the subjects of warrantless searches be warned
about their right to refuse consent.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Consent Search as an Exception to the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.3
4
The Minnesota State Constitution contains an identical provision.
The United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.5
The Fourth Amendment only protects persons who have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the property being searched or seized. There-
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See MINN. CONST. art. 1, 10.
5. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police, which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment, is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Proc-
ess Clause.").
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reversing a defendant's
conviction where the government electronically recorded defendant's telephone
conversations because the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy and
therefore defendant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated).
1156 [Vol. 24
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fore, when determining whether there has been a search or seizure, the
initial issues to considered are whether the defendant has a protected ex-
pectation of privacy and whether that privacy has been invaded.7 Courts
consider the surrounding circumstances in determining the reasonable-
ness of alleged expectations of privacy.8 After the initial determination of
a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is a strong presumption that a
warrant is required for searches or seizures.9
Despite this presumption, there is a group of well-established excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. "By and large, the majority of the ar-
ticulated exceptions to the warrant requirement are based upon the con-
clusion that under certain circumstances, the exigencies of a situation
make immediate search and seizure without the benefit of a warrant im-
perative. The exceptions to the warrant requirement include stop and
frisk searches,' 2 plain view searches, 3 motor vehicle searches, searches• ..- 15 .. .16
incident to arrest, and searches under exigent circumstances. Consent
7. See id. See also State v. Van Alstine, 305 Minn. 276, 284, 232 N.W.2d 899,
904 (1975) (holding that where a defendant wrote a note in jail and gave it to an-
other inmate to pass to yet another inmate, the defendant had no expectation of
privacy because surveillance is expected in jail).
8. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-55; Van Alstine, 305 Minn. at 284-85, 232 N.W.2d
at 904-05.
9. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
10. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
11. George S. Lochhead, Note, Fourth Amendment: Expanding the Scope of Auto-
mobile Consent Searches, Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991), 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 773, 775-76 (1992). "Conversely, in situations where exigent cir-
cumstances which might otherwise justify forgoing a valid search warrant do not
exist, the Supreme Court has rejected warrantless search exceptions." Id. at 776.
12. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a revolver seized from
defendant was admissible evidence where officer grasped defendant and patted
down the outer surfaces of defendant's clothing because the search was reasonable
to protect officer safety); see also State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1980)
(holding an officer's search beneath the front seat of defendant's car was reason-
able to protect officer safety and was therefore valid as an exception to the prob-
able cause requirement).
13. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (holding that seizure of
automobile registration card was valid); see also State v. Shevchuk, 291 Minn. 365,
191 N.W.2d 557 (1971) (holding that search of defendant's car was constitution-
ally permissible where law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle because it was
speeding, looked through the vehicle's open door, and observed a firearm in plain
sight).
14. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that the search
of vehicle for contraband liquor was valid); see also State v. Gutberlet, 346 N.W.2d
639, 644 (Minn. 1984) (holding that search of defendant's car was constitutionally
permissible where police found drugs in his pocket and in his car sitting in plain
view).
15. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) ("[I]n the case of law-
ful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only a valid exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search
19981 1157
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searches are among this limited group.17
B. Role of Consent Searches in Law Enforcement
Consent searches have "obvious utility" for law enforcement,18 and
they are often relied upon by law enforcement officers as a means of in-
vestigating suspected criminal conduct. 9 Because there is no probable
cause or warrant requirement, consent searches are an attractive al-
ternative as a matter of administrative convenience, especially in cases
where the law enforcement officer has to travel some distance to obtain a
20
warrant.
Commentators agree that the majority of situations in which consent
searches are utilized involve situations where ", robable cause is lacking
and thus no search warrant could be obtained. Additionally, assuming
the subject of the search does not place limitations on the consent given,
a search based on consent may be broader in scope than a search con-
ducted pursuant to a search warrant.2 3 Another benefit of warrantless
under the Fourth Amendment."); see also State v. Falgren, 176 Minn. 346, 223 N.W.
455 (1929) (holding warrantless seizure of gambling machines was valid where
machines were being used and in plain view of officer).
16. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that the
police were not justified in warrantless search where defendant had no access to
evidence which was guarded at time of the search); see also State v. Mollberg, 310
Minn. 376, 246 N.W.2d 463 (1976) (holding that warrantless seizure of contra-
band in plain view was proper where the whereabouts of the defendant were un-
known, the closest municipality was miles away from the location, and there was no
guarantee that a magistrate would be available).
17. See discussion infra Parts II.C to II.E on consent searches as an exception
to the warrant requirement.
18. Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, 221 (1997). The author notes that despite the practical value of con-
sent searches, they "raise profound constitutional questions." Id.
19. 2 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 8.1, at 611-12 (1978).
20. See id. (citing LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY, ET. AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 159
(1967)).
21. See LAFAVE supra note 19, at 611. Consent searches allow for possibly valu-
able evidence to be uncovered, where it otherwise might not be discovered. See
Lochhead, supra note 11, at 777 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). "In situations
where the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to
arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of
obtaining important and reliable evidence." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
22. See generally LAFAvE, supra note 19, at 624 (explaining that when law en-
forcement officers rely on consent as a basis for a search, "they have no more
authority than they have apparently been given by the consent.").
23. See id. at 611. Consent searches are "not subject to challenge simply be-
cause what was permitted was 'a general exploratory search' beyond what any
1158 [Vol. 24
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consent searches is that when a law enforcement officer finds no evidence
of illegal conduct, the officer may focus his or her energy on other en-
deavors.
2 4
C. United States Supreme Court's Approach to Consent Searches
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged the consent
search as a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment in 1946.25 The
26
Court has articulated two justifications for the consent search exception.
"First, consent searches promote efficient and effective law enforce-
ment."2 7 Second, consent searches are a valid exception to the warrant
requirement because it allows "citizens to choose whether or not they wish
to exercise their constitutional rights."
2 8
In light of this policy, the Supreme Court has held that a search may
be conducted in the absence of a warrant with the consent of the subject
of the search.29  In its most important decision on consent searches,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,s° the Supreme Court clarified the standards for
admissibility of evidence seized as a result of these warrantless 
searches. 31
The issue before the court in Schneckloth was whether valid consent re-
32
quires proof that the suspect knew he had the right to refuse to consent.
search warrant could authorize." Id. (quoting May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981)).
24. See Lochhead, supra note 11, at 777. It follows that in situations where the
search fails to result in the seizure of incriminating evidence, "the amount of time
that innocent suspects are detained are minimized." Id.
25. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946) (holding that de-
fendant's consent validated warrantless search and subsequent seizure of gas ra-
tioning coupons); see also Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946) (holding
that defendant who agreed to permit inspection of his records and accounts vol-
untarily waived his claim to privacy, and therefore, seizure of evidence did not vio-
late defendant's Fourth Amendment rights).
26. See Barrio, supra note 18, at 219-21.
27. Id. at 219-20 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228
(1973)).
28. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Consent allows in-
nocent suspects to avoid the inconvenience and embarrassment of an ongoing in-
vestigation. Id. at 227-28.
29. See id. at 219.
30. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The case involved a consent search conducted pur-
suant to a traffic stop, where a friend of the defendant's consented to a search of
the car which was unsupported by either probable cause or a search warrant. Id. at
227-28.
31. Prior to Schneckloth, "there existed considerable doubt on the question of
whether... a consent search is simply a matter of the consenting party having
acted voluntarily, or whether instead it involves an actual waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights." LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 612.
32. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223. Although the law enforcement officers did
1998] 1159
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More specifically, given the Court's position that it is impracticable to
prove knowledge, the issue in Schneckloth was whether law enforcement of-
ficers had to advise suspects of their Fourth Amendment rights prior to
requesting consent to search.33
The Schneckloth court held that no warning was required under the
34
Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the court divided its33
analysis into two parts. First, the Court interpreted the Fourth Amend-
ment as prohibiting police from abusing their authority in attempting to
gain a suspect's consent, but not requiring law enforcement officers to en-
sure that a suspect has intelligently waived his or her Fourth Amendment
36rights. Second, the court utilized its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in
determining the meaning of "voluntary consent. " 37 In doing so, the Court
focused on two principles: one, Miranda warnings only apply to suspects
38
in custody, and two, the due process totality of the circumstances test
controls the admissibility of incriminating statements given in response to39
non-custodial questioning. Additionally, the Court noted that a re-
quirement that law enforcement give all suspects Fourth Amendment
warnings before eliciting consent to search would impose too great a bur-
den on law enforcement.
not use force in gaining the suspect's consent, they did not advise him of his right
to resist the search by refusing to give consent. Id. at 220-21.
33. See Bario, supra note 18, at 231 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230).
34. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249.
35. See Barrio, supra note 18, at 231.
36. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237-42.
37. See id. at 247. During the interval between Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court considered
about 30 cases where it was required to make a determination as to whether a con-
fession was made voluntarily. In many of these cases the court based its analysis on
the Fifth Amendment. See William N. Mehlhaf, Note, A Valid Consent to Search Does
Not Require Knowledge of the Constitutionally Protected Right to Refuse - Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), 9 GONZ. L. REv. 845, 84748 n.13 (1974).
38. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247. The court found that most consent searches
occur during noncustodial police-citizen encounters, which normally take place
on the highway or in a subject's home or workplace. See id. The Court focused on
the difference between the informality of these circumstances and custodial inter-
rogations. See id. at 232. The Court noted that Fourth Amendment Miranda warn-
ings are designed to dispel psychological coercion, and concluded that because
psychological coercion cannot be presumed in consent search situations, any
Fourth Amendment warnings would be unnecessary. See id. at 232 (citing Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)).
39. See id. at 247.
40. See id. at 232. "Because 'the circumstances that prompt the initial request
to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police
questioning,' the Court decided that Fourth Amendment warnings would inter-
rupt the flow of questioning and frustrate investigative efforts." Barrio, supra note
18, at 232 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232). Justice Marshall, in his dissenting
opinion in Schneckloth, argued that there was nothing impractical in requiring law
1160 [Vol. 24
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The Schneckloth Court held that consent must be voluntary based on• . 41
the totality of the circumstances. Under this totality approach, the fol-
4' 43 T 45lowing factors may be considered: age, experience, intelligence,
46 47
education, knowledge of ability to refuse, length and conditions of de-
48 49 50
tention, and threats of physical violence. Other factors may include51 52
claim of authority, show of force or coercive surroundings, refusal to
enforcement to inform subjects that they have a right to refuse consent. He ar-
gued that Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents had been informing subjects of
this right for some time and had suffered no drawbacks. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
287 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
41. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27 (listing possible factors for trial courts to
weigh).
42. See id. Because courts must analyze the facts of each case individually un-
der the totality of the circumstances test, "it is impossible to derive a bright-line
legal rule that would resolve the voluntariness issue in every case." Rebecca A.
Stack, Note, Airport Drug Searches: Giving Content to the Concept of Free and Voluntary
Consent, 77 VA. L. REv. 183, 184 (1991).
43. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (holding that a 22 year old defendant with an eleventh-grade
education was "plainly capable of knowing consent," even though she might have
felt unusually threatened).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bekoff, 529 F. Supp. 425, 431 (D. Nev. 1982)
(holding that the defendant, "a young, attractive female who has had little contact
with law enforcement officers," might not have felt free to walk away from three
male officers), affd, 692 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558-59. "Although the Constitution does
not require 'proof of knowledge if a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effec-
tive consent to a search,' such knowledge was highly relevant to the determination
that there had been consent." Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234). While most
states consider knowledge of the right to refuse consent as a factor in determining
the voluntariness of consent, two states-New Jersey and Mississippi-have made
knowledge of the right to refuse consent a requirement. See infra notes 62-72 and
accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., United States v.Jaramillo, 714 F. Supp. 323, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
affid, 891 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1069 (1990) (holding that
initial encounter between law enforcement and defendant was consensual because
"the exit vestibule, which was open to the public, was not an intimidating or coer-
cive environment").
49. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
50. See Michael E. Postma, Comment, State v. Arroyo: Consent Searches Following
Illegal Police Conduct-Removing the Taint from the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 18 J.
CONTEMP. L. 107, 109-10 (1992) (citing 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2 (2d
ed. 1987)).
51. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546-48 (1968) (holding
that the search was not based on valid consent where defendant's grandmother
allowed the officers to search her house because one of the officers said, "I have a
search warrant to search your house.")
52. See, e.g., Harless v. Turner, 456 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding
that the search was not based on valid consent where four or five officers went to
1998] 1161
7
Twitero: The Future of Vehicle Consent Searches in Minnesota: State V. Geo
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
53545
consent, confession or cooperation,5 4 denial of guilt,55 right to counsel,5 657
and deception. Additionally, the consent must be given freely, without
coercion or threats.
D. State Court Approaches to Consent Searches
59
Nearly every state in the nation follows the Schneckloth totality test.
the defendant's home and "routed defendant... out of bed" at 1:45 a.m.).
53. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981) ("[W]hen an ac-
cused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interroga-
tion, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he re-
sponded to police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of
his rights.").
54. See, e.g., United States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting
that the chances of a consent being found voluntary are enhanced if the consent is
preceded by a valid confession).
55. See, e.g., Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (noting
that consent is inherently voluntary if it was given by a person denying his guilt).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 329 F. Supp. 630, 634 (D. Minn. 1971)
(holding that defendant who had asked for counsel was entitled to advice of coun-
sel as to his legal rights and what would be required to obtain a search warrant).
57. See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (stating that defen-
dant's incriminating statements to undercover agent were admissible evidence).
58. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also State v.
Mitchell, 172 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Minn. 1969) ("'[w] here there is coercion there can-
not be consent"') (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968)).
59. See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 168 (Alaska 1979); State v. Paredes, 810
P.2d 607, 610 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Duncan v. State, 802 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Ark.
1991); People v. Avalos, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 450, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); People v.
Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1389 (Colo. 1997); State v. Reddick, 456 A.2d 1191, 1195
(Conn. 1983); Knight v. State, 690 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 1996); Burton v. United
States, 657 A.2d 741, 745 (D.C. 1994); State v. Collins, 661 So. 2d 962, 964 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); State v.Jackson, 412 S.E.2d 593, 596 (Ga. App. 1991); State v.
Trainor,925 P.2d 818, 829 (Haw. 1996); State v. Holcomb, 912 P.2d 664, 670
(Idaho Ct. App. 1995); People v. Cardenas, 604 N.E.2d 953, 955, (Ill. App. Ct.
1992); Whipps v. State, 685 N.E.2d 697, 698 (Ind. 1997); State v. Manna, 534
N.W.2d 642, 644 (Iowa 1995); State v. Ninci, 936 P.2d 1364, 1374 (Kan. 1997); An-
derson v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Par-
fait, 693 So. 2d 1232, 1240 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Cress, 576 A.2d 1366, 1367
(Me. 1990); State v. Clowney, 589 A.2d 86, 88 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Com-
monwealth v. Sanna, 674 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Mass. 1997); People v. Lumpkin, 231
N.W.2d 637, 638 (Mich. 1975); State v. Garcia, 930 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); State v. Rushton, 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Mont. 1994); State v. Ready, 565
N.W.2d 728, 733 (Neb. 1997); Alejandre v. State, 903 P.2d 794, 797 (Nev. 1995);
State v. Prevost, 690 A.2d 1029, 1031 (N.H. 1997); State v. Pallor, 923 P.2d 599, 603
(N.M. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Caldwell, 221 634 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995); State v. Williams, 333 S.E.2d 708, 714 (N.C. 1985); State v. Everson, 474
N.W.2d 695, 704 (N.D. 1991); State v.Jackson, 673 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996);Johnson v. State, 905 P.2d 818, 820 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Poul-
son, 945 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Paredes-Rosaria,
1162 [Vol. 24
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Indeed, only two states have deviated from the Schneckloth totality 
test,60
61 6
requiring stricter standards in consent search cases. In State v. Johnson,
62
the New Jersey Supreme Court elected to impose a higher standard than
63
Schneckloth, based on the New Jersey Constitution. Similarly, in Penick v.
State,64 the Mississippi Supreme Court added to the requirements set forth
by Schneckloth.65 Both the Penick and Johnson courts decided that the extra
protection needed in consent search situations was that the subject of the
66
search have the knowledge of the right to refuse consent.
In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the proposition
that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that a law enforcement officer inform the subject of the search that he or
67
she has the right to refuse to consent to the search. The majority of
other states have expressly followed this holding. 8 Despite this, in John-
son, the NewJersey Supreme Court held that "where the State seeks tojus-
tify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of showing that the
consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the
right to refuse consent."69
700 A.2d 1296, 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1374
(R.I. 1984); State v. Dorce, 465 S.E.2d 772, 773 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Dreps, 558 N.W.2d 339, 341 (S.D. 1996); State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230
(Tenn. 1996); Broussard v. State, No. 12-96-00119-CR, 1997 WL 530749, at *3
(Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 1997); State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996); State v. Zaccaro, 574 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Vt. 1990); McGee v. Common-
wealth, 477 S.E.2d 14, 19 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Cantrell, 875 P.2d 1208,
1211-12 (Wash. 1994); State v. Justice, 445 S.E.2d 202, 208 (W. Va. 1994); State v.
Gaulrapp, 558 N.W.2d 696, 699 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251,
256 (Wyo. 1985).
60. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
62. 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975).
63. See Johnson, 346 A.2d at 68.
64. 440 So. 2d 23 (Miss. 1991).
65. See Jones, 607 So. 2d at 28.
66. See infra notes 69 & 72 and accompanying text.
67. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
68. See, e.g., State v. Acinelli, No. 1 CA-CR 96-0541, 1997 WL 411590, at *4
(Ariz. Ct. App. July 24, 1997); Duncan v. State, 802 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Ark. 1991);
State v. Overton, 596 So. 2d 1344, 1353 (La. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Flores,570
P.2d 965, 966 (Or. 1977); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
69. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (NJ. 1975). In Johnson, the court rea-
soned:
Many persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer
to make a search as having the force of law. Unless it is shown by the
State that the person involved knew that he had the right to refuse to
accede to such a request, his assenting to the search is not meaningful.
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Like the New Jersey Supreme Court in Johnson, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court in Penick also held that a subject must be informed of the
right to refuse:
We accord to the U.S. Supreme Court the utmost respect in its inter-
pretation of the U.S. Constitution. We must, however, reserve for this
Court the sole and absolute right to make the final interpretation of
our state Constitution and, while of great persuasion, we will not con-
cede that simply because the U.S. Supreme Court may interpret a U.S.
Constitutional provision that we must give the same interpretation to
essentially the same words in a provision of our state Constitution.
70
The Mississippi Supreme Court further explained that consent is
only valid where there was a knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of the
subject's constitutional right not to be searched.] According to the Penick
court, in order for consent to knowledgeable the subject must know of his
or her right to refuse consent.72
Although New Jersey and Mississippi are the only states to require
that the subject of the search must have knowledge of the right to refuse73
consent, several states have considered notification of this right via writ-
ten consent forms. 4  However, these states have considered the use of
written consent forms to be only one of the factors to weigh in considera-
tion of the totality of the circumstances.
75
None of the states have held that consent searches in traffic stop
situations require any more attention than other consent search situa-
tions.7 6 Moreover, no other jurisdiction has required that law enforce-
ment attempts in obtaining consent need to be tape recorded.7 7 In sum,
70. Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983).
71. See id. at 550-51.
72. See id. at 550.
73. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., State v. Acinelli, No. 1 CA-CR 96-0541, 1997 WL 411590, *4 (Ariz.
Ct. App. July 24, 1997); Knight v. State, 690 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 1996); People v.
Cardenas, 604 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); State v. Ninci, 936 P.2d 1364,
1374-75 (Kan. 1997); State v. Ossey, 446 So. 2d 280, 287 n.6 (La. 1984), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 916 (1984); State v. Prevost, 690 A.2d 1029, 1031 (N.H. 1997); People v.
Valdivia, 653 N.Y.S.2d 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 967
(Or. 1977); Commonwealth v. Paredes-Rosaria, 700 A.2d 1296, 1300 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997); State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1375 (R.I. 1984); State v. Cantrell, 875
P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Wash. 1994); State v. Justice, 445 S.E.2d 202, 208-09 (W. Va.
1994).
75. See supra notes 68 & 74 and authority cited therein.
76. But seeJones v. State, 607 So. 2d 23, 28 (Miss. 1991). Mississippi, which
requires that consent be "voluntary" as well as "knowledgeable" in that "the defen-
dant knows that he/she has a right to refuse" consent, has expanded its knowledge
requirement to all consent search situations, including traffic stops. See id.
77. At the time the Minnesota Supreme Court held that all custodial interro-
gations must be tape recorded, only one other state had done so. See Stephan v.
State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) (requiring electronic recording of custo-
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78
only two of the fifty states, in addition to Minnesota, have expanded a
defendant's rights in consent search situations.79
E. Minnesota Case Law on Consent Searches Prior to 1997
The Minnesota Supreme Court first acknowledged no search warrant
is needed when the subject consents to a search in its 1948 decision, City of
St. Paul v. Stovall. In this early case, the court noted the importance of
upholding the Fourth Amendment,81 but also recognized the necessity of
consent searches:
The police courts of our large cities are often daily confronted with
large numbers of petty offenders, and it would be intolerable to re-
quire that their proceedings be in form those prescribed for higher
courts and higher offenses. Their proceedings must of necessity be
more or less summary and informal, and so long as the substantial or
constitutional rights of persons charged are not infringed or violated,
convictions cannot be reversed for mere irregularity.8
2
83
In State v. Armstrong, the court clearly established that the burden of
admitting evidence gained as a result of a consent search is on the State.
4
"The prosecutor has the burden of proving the consent was freely and
voluntarily given." The court explained that " [i] t is not enough that the
suspect yields to color of police authority. Had the officer's request been
accompanied by force or threat of force, obviously the articles defendant
revealed would not be admissible in evidence."
6
dial interrogations conducted in places of detention under Alaska Constitution's
due process clause).
78. In George, the Minnesota Supreme Court has increased the level of review
of consent search cases. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. Additionally,
the concurrence in George warns practitioners of other requirements to come. See
infra note 158 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
80. 225 Minn. 309, 312, 30 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1948) (holding that seized evi-
dence was admissible where "defendant waived any rights which he might have
had when he permitted the officers to enter his home and 'look around' without a
search warrant, as he admits himself that he did not try to stop them in any way").
81. See Stoval 225 Minn. at 313, 30 N.W.2d at 641. "We do not approve or
condone any laxity on the part of public officers in making arrests or searches
without warrants when the facts and circumstances make it possible for them to be
equipped with the proper legal documents." Id.
82. Id. (citing State v. Olson, 115 Minn. 153, 155, 131 N.W. 1084, 1085
(1911)).
83. 292 Minn. 471,194 N.W.2d 293 (1972).
84. See Armstrong, 292 Minn. at 473, 194 N.W.2d at 294.
85. Id. (citing State v. Mitchell, 285 Minn. 153, 158, 172 N.W.2d 66, 69
(1969)).
86. Id. (citation omitted). The court considered the entire picture in deter-
mining that this was a voluntary consent. See id. "Here, however, by defendant's
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In State v. O'Neill,s 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the
Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test. The O'Neill court held that
a "warrantless search may be conducted when the subject of the search
voluntarily consents to it, the voluntariness to be determined from the to-. .89
tality of the surrounding circumstances." In weighing the totality of the
circumstances, the court found that a vehicle stop, which resulted in de-
fendant's consent to search the car, was 
valid.9 0
When the court next considered the consent search exception in a
vehicle stop situation, in State v. Hoven,9' the court found that because the
stop of the vehicle was improper, the consent was invalid as well.9 The
court explained that the ""defendant's consent to the vehicle search was
'come at by exploitation' of his illegal arrest," and therefore the defen-
dant's conviction was set aside.93 In so holding, the court was again follow-
ing the United States Supreme Court's position, this time from Wong Sun
v. United States.
9 4
In State v. Hanley, 95 the court established that consent to search may
96
be given by a third party. In adopting the United States Supreme
Court's test on third party consents,97 the Hanley court held that the State
has the burden of proving that the third party who is giving consent must
possess "common authority" over the subject of the search. The Hanley
own testimony, although he was 'adamant and uncooperative,' he acquiesced with
minimum protest. Under these circumstances, the trial court was justified in not
suppressing the evidence." Id.
87. 299 Minn. 60, 216 N.W.2d 822 (1974).
88. See ONeill, 299 Minn. at 69, 216 N.W.2d at 828. In O'Neill, after enforce-
ment officers had stopped defendant's car and after defendant had gotten out of
the car, defendant said, "If you are looking for the guns, they are in the car." Id. at
62, 216 N.W.2d at 824. Thus, the court concluded that the defendant consented
to the search. Id. at 69, 216 N.W.2d at 828.
89. Id. at 69, 216 N.W.2d at 828 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973)).
90. See O'Neill, 299 Minn. at 70, 216 N.W.2d at 828.
91. 269 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1978).
92. See Hoven, 269 N.W.2d at 854. The defendant had been stopped for mi-
nor traffic violations, which the state conceded were "fatally deficient in their lack
of a statement of probable cause." Id. at 851. Therefore, the arrest of defendant
was illegal. See id. at 852. Additionally, the court found that even if the arrest had
been legal, it would have invalidated the arrest as a pretext, which "cannot be used
tojustify an legitimate otherwise illegal searches and seizures." Id. at 852.
93. Id. at 854.
94. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
95. 363 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1985).
96. See Hanley, 363 N.W.2d at 738 (holding that defendant's girlfriend gave
valid consent to search defendant's apartment).
97. SeeUnited States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
98. Hanley, 363 N.W.2d at 738 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171). If common
authority does not exist, the third party may possess "other sufficient relationship
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." Id.
1166 [Vol. 24
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court also adopted the Supreme Court's definition of "common authority"
in relation to the right to give consent to search. 99 A third party has
common authority over the property if there is "mutual use of the proZ-
erty by persons having joint access or control for most purposes ....
Since Hanley, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not deviated from the
Supreme Court's direction in third2party consents.10 1
It was not until State v. Dezso, however, that the Minnesota Supreme
Court performed an independent, in-depth analysis into consent
searches.10 3 In Dezso, the court considered consent to search in a traffic
stop situation and made clear that "[flailure to object [to a request for
consent] is not the same as consent," and that "[c]onsent must be re-
ceived, not extracted."10 4 The court tried to balance the need for preserv-
ing the safety of the community and preserving individuals' liberty inter-105
ests. In doing so, the court examined whether the defendant volun-
tarily consented based upon the totality of the circumstances, "including
the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant [was], and
99. See Hanley, 363 N.W.2d at 738-39.
100. Id. at 739 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7). Additionally, it must be
"reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of
their number might permit the common area to be searched." Id.
101. See State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 1992) (holding that de-
fendant's parents had common authority over defendant's home and could there-
fore give third party consent to search home).
102. 512 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1994).
103. In past cases where the Minnesota Supreme Court has considered con-
sent searches, the court gave the issue a brief look, doing no more analysis than
required by Schneckloth. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 292 Minn. 471, 473, 194
N.W.2d 293, 294 (1972) (holding that defendant consented to search of his pock-
ets because defendant "acquiesced with minimum protest"); State v. Alayon, 459
N.W.2d 325, 330-31 (Minn. 1990) (holding that defendant consented to search of
his home where officers had put away their guns, defendant was not handcuffed,
and defendant cooperated in the search).
104. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d at 880. "Mere acquiescence on a claim of police
authority or submission in the face of a show of force is, of course, not enough."
Id. (citing State v. Howard, 373 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. 1985)).
105. See Dezso, 512 N.W.2d at 880. "The police must be able to seek the coop-
eration and ask questions of individuals if the safety and security of the community
is to be preserved. At the same time, individuals have a liberty interest, constitu-
tionally protected, against unreasonable prying into their personal affairs." Id.
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-25). The Dezso court went on to explain:
So it is that an officer has a right to ask to search and an individual has
a right to say no. Questioning by the police, for the innocent as well as
the criminally implicated, even under benign circumstances, can be an
intimidating experience; but reasonable persons understand that this is
part of the "accommodation of the complex values" involved.
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what was said and how it was said."
10 6
Beginning its analysis of the circumstances, the court noted that " [i] t
would seem there was apparent consent." 1°7 Despite this apparent con-
sent, the court continued its analysis. The court considered the surround-
ings of the stop, including that it occurred at nighttime, on a highway, and
in a squad car. 0 8 The court also considered the nature of the request for
consent: the officer, in a "respectful and matter-of-fact" tone, asked if he
could "take a look" at defendant's wallet two times and asked about a pa-
per in defendant's hand two times. 09 Additionally, the court explained
how the officer leaned towards the defendant, trying to look in the defen-
dant's wallet." 0 The Dezso court found that the state had not sustained its
burden of proof that there was voluntary consent."'
III. THE STATE V. GEORGE DECISION
A. The Facts
Thomas Otto George was driving a motorcycle on Interstate 90,112 on
106. Id. at 880. This "totality of the circumstances" test is what the Supreme
Court has outlined as the correct test. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying
text. Additionally, the vast majority of the states follow this standard as well. See
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
107. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d at 880. The trial court did not find the defendant's tes-
timony convincing that the officer had grabbed the wallet from him. See id. In-
stead, the trial court found that the defendant handed over the wallet without ver-
bal protest. See id.
108. See id. The court also noted that there was "nothing unusual about the
defendant," who was simply a driver stopped for speeding. Id.
109. Id. at 880-81. The court noted the way in which the officer asked his
questions. "The request to search the wallet ('Mind if I take a look?') was couched
in terms of whether the defendant had any objection to the search." Id. at 880.
110. See id. The officer had tumed on a video camera with audio capabilities
prior to the conversation. See id. at 878-79. However, the camera points forward
and did not videotape the exchange. See id. at 879.
111. See id. at 881. In considering the totality of the circumstances, in which
no one factor is controlling, the court explained why the defendant's consent was
not voluntary:
The officer's questions, though couched in nonauthoritative language,
were official and persistent, and were accompanied by the officer's
body movement in leaning over towards the defendant seated next to
him. There is no indication that defendant was aware that he could re-
fuse to let the officer see the wallet. From the nature of the questions
asked and the answers given, it is not at all clear that defendant was
voluntarily consenting to a search of his wallet.
Id.
112. See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 576 (Minn. 1997). The stop occurred
on the stretch of Interstate 90 which is in Nobles County, Minnesota. See id.
1168 [Vol. 24
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his way to a motorcycle rally in Sturgis, South Dakota." 3 While on routine
patrol, Minnesota State Trooper Eric Vaselaar stopped George's motorcy-
cle because of its lighting configuration. 114 After some discussion about
why George had been stopped, the trooper issued George two warnings
for traffic violations."
6
The trooper then inquired whether George "'had any objections if
[the trooper] wanted to take a couple of moments and take a look
through the bike looking for the things [they'd] talked about,"' such as
weapons, alcohol, or controlled substances. The parties dispute• 118
George's answer to this question. Trooper Vaselaar testified that
George said that he had "no objections" to the search of his bike,' 19
whereas George testified that he responded with a "yes," adding that the
search would be "a waste of time." George explained that Vaselaar
stated that it was his time and he was "gonna search it anyway. " 12 1 Ac-
cording to George's testimony, Vaselaar did not explain that George had
an option to deny the search. Additionally, George testified that he did
123not feel that he had given consent to the search of his motorcycle .
Pursuant to the search, Vaselaar uncovered a box of .22 magnum
ammunition, a .22 magnum revolver for which George did not have a• 124
permit, three homemade cigarettes which smelled of marijuana, a nine
113. See id. The Sturgis Motorcycle rally is an annual motorcycle rally that
takes place in Sturgis, South Dakota. It attracts motorcyclists from all over the
country. See Ann Grauvogl, Telling Stories of the Hills, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Oct. 12,
1997, at 8G.
114. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 576. Trooper Vaselaar testified that the motor-
cycle appeared to have three headlights, a configuration which Vaselaar believed
was in violation of Minnesota traffic laws. See id.
115. See id. After stopping the motorcycle, Vaselaar told George that he had
been pulled over because of the lighting configuration on his motorcycle, and
asked for George's driver's license and that George sit in Vaselaar's squad car. See
id. at 576-77. Vaselaar also requested that George remove the folding knife he had
attached to his belt, and leave it and his jacket on his motorcycle. See id. at 577.
While in the squad car, and after Vaselaar asked, George explained that his ad-
dress was incorrect on his license. See id.
116. See id. at 577. Vaselaar issued warnings "for not having the correct address
on his license and for the motorcycle's lighting configuration." Id.
117. Id. (alterations in original). Prior to this question, the trooper had in-
quired whether George had any weapons, open containers of alcohol, or con-
trolled substances in his possession; George replied that he did not. See id.
118. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 577. This testimony occurred at an omnibus
hearing. See id.





124. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 577. The ammunition was found in a plastic
bag, inside George's jacket. See id. After finding this, Vaselaar asked George
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millimeter handgun and ammunition, a pipe, and a canister containing.. 125
marijuana. George contested the basis for the stop and the validity of
the search, seeking suppression of the items seized. The trial court de-
nied this motion and found that the stop was valid, as was 
the search.1 7
George pleaded guilty to illegal possession of a handgun, and preserved
the search and seizure issues for appeal.2 The court of appeals held that
both the stop and the search were valid.2
9
B. The Majority's Decision
With Justice Gardebring writing for the majority, the supreme court
reversed the decisions of both lower courts and vacated George's convic-
tion. The court divided its decision by the two main issues in the case,
the basis for the stop and the consent search.'
On the issue of the stop, the court held that "Vaselaar did not have
an objective legal basis for suspecting that the [sic] George was driving his
motorcycle in violation of any motor vehicle law." 32 The court focused its
analysis on the fact that George's front lights were standard, factory-
where the gun was located. See id. George replied that he had forgotten about the
gun and that it was also in his jacket. See id. When Vaselaar learned that George
did not have a permit for the weapon, Vaselaar arrested him. See id.
125. See id. After George was arrested, Vaselaar searched him incident to ar-
rest, at which time he found a cigarette case containing three homemade ciga-
rettes, which smelled of marijuana. See id. Vaselaar once again asked George if he
had any weapons or controlled substances in his possession. See id. This time,
George admitted that the nine millimeter handgun, ammunition, a pipe, and can-
ister containing marijuana were in his motorcycle's travel pack, which Vaselaar re-
trieved. See id.
126. See id. George claimed that there was simply no probable cause for the
traffic stop because Vaselaar knew the headlight configuration was not illegal and
also that Vaselaar's asserted "'objective legal basis' for the stop... was only a pre-
text for his real intention of obtaining consent to search for evidence of other ille-
gal activity." Id.
127. See id. Noting that it was aware that the state patrol had initiated a pro-
gram targeting motorcycle riders on their way to or from the Sturgis Rally, the trial
court said that the stop was "no doubt.., a pretext stop in that the officer's inten-
tion was to seek a consensual search of [George's] motorcycle and belongings."
Id. Despite this, the trial court concluded that the stop was valid, based on
Vaselaar's belief that the lighting configuration violated Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 169.49. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 577-78.
128. See id. at 576. George pleaded guilty to illegal possession of a handgun
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 624.714. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 576.
George preserved his omnibus issues pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d
854 (Minn. 1980). See George, 557 N.W.2d at 576.
129. See id. at 578.
130. See id. at 575.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 578.
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installed equipment, the configuration of which did not violate any law.
3 3
The court explained that a law enforcement officer must have a "par-134
ticularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity. Al-
though not much is required for an objective basis to justify a valid traffic" 131
stop, it must be more than a "mere hunch.
Vaselaar testified that he believed George's lighting configuration on
his motorcycle was in violation of the traffic code, and therefore, effectu-
136
ated a traffic stop. But because the lighting configuration in question
was in fact not a violation of the traffic code, and the trooper observed no
other laws being violated, the court held that the basis for the stop was in-
valid."3
After holding that the stop was invalid for lack of an objective legal
basis, the court specifically noted that this holding alone "would be suffi-S ,138
cient to resolve this case." The court chose, however, to address the
consent search issue "in order to provide further guidance to the trial
courts in considering such matters." The court began its analysis of the
consent search by briefly noting that consent is a lawful means of a search,
so long as the consent is given voluntarily. The court then cited its deci-
sion in Dezso, where it held that "[c]onsent must be received, not ex-
tracted.
141
The court proceeded to consider the problems inherent in establish-
ing the voluntariness of the consent obtained. 4 2 The court noted that it
had "serious concerns" about the "'pretext problem'" of traffic stops for143
two reasons. First, the court emphasized that "'very few drivers can trav-
133. See id. at 578-79. Vaselaar thought that George had more than two head-
lights on his motorcycle, a configuration which is in violation of Minnesota Stat-
utes section 169.49. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. Actually, the motorcycle had
one headlight and two auxiliary passing lamps, which is a valid lighting configura-
tion pursuant to Minnesota Rule 7425.0110, subdivisions 6, 7, 33. See George, 557
N.W.2d at 578.
134. Id. (citing Berge v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732
(Minn. 1985)).
135. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578 (citing State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824,
825-25 (Minn. 1989)).
136. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 579.
139. Id. This statement and choice by the court is significant on its own; it
demonstrates the importance the court finds in this issue.
140. See id. at 579.
141. Id. (citing State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1994)).
142. See infra notes 143 & 144 and accompanying text.
143. George, 557 N.W.2d at 579. The court notes that the pretext problem
arises from the United States Supreme Court's recent holding that "the constitu-
tional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not turn on the actual motivations of
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erse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation.'
144
Second, the court expressed concern for the rights of motorists because of
the "enormous discretion in enforcing traffic laws," and the opportunity
for police to take advantage of their position and stop vehicles driven by
motorists who belong to particular groups. 145
The court demonstrated its concern for these possibilities when it
cited one source that suggests that there may be no such thing as a volun-
146tary consent in a routine traffic stop situation. The court warned that,
"[s]hort of rejecting the concept of consent to search in the context of
routine traffic stops, courts can and should demand sufficient proof in an
individual case that the consent to search was truly express, clear and vol-
untary. 147 The court again referred to its decision in Dezso for an example
of one way to achieve this goal, "by subjecting claims of voluntary consent
in this context [i.e., routine traffic stops] to careful appellate review.
" ' 48
In George, the majority announced that it would apply a careful review
of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the defendant
voluntarily consented to the search. 49 After reviewing the case, the court
concluded that George was unaware of his right to refuse to give con-
sent.10 The court also noted the presence of two officers at the scene for
a minor traffic offense.' 51 These circumstances led to the court's conclu-
sion that "[e] quivocation as to consent in such intimidating circumstances
is not enough to meet the constitutional test of Schneckloth and Bumper." "
As a result of the court's careful review, George's conviction for possession
of a handgun without a permit was vacated.
144. George, 557 N.W.2d at 579 (citing B. JAMES GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 65 (1969 ed.)).
145. George, 557 N.W.2d at 579. The court further emphasizes that the mem-
bers of such groups are "'identified by factors that are totally impermissible as a
basis for law enforcement activity.'" Id. at 579-80 (citing United States v. Scopo, 19
F.3d 777, 785-86 (2d Cir, 1994) (Newman,J., concurring)).
146. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 580 (citing Stack, supra note 42, at 202). "[T]he
concept of voluntary consent ought to be deemed meaningless in the context of a
so-called consensual encounter between police and a citizen at an airport or in the
context of other police-citizen contacts, e.g., when an officer is effecting a routine
traffic stop." George, 557 N.W.2d at 580.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 557 N.W.2d at 580-81. The Dezso court never announced a
heightened review of the totality of the circumstances. Only in George did the
court begin to analyze the circumstances with a careful review. See infra notes 171
& 172 and accompanying text.
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C. The Concurrence
In a special concurrence, Justice Tomijanovich expounded on the
consent search issue, emphasizing two aspects in particular:
The first is whether it is legitimate for a police officer as part of a
routine traffic stop, and in the absence of probable cause to search, to
ask the stopped driver for consent to search and to search pursuant to
that consent. The second aspect of the issue is whether, if it is legiti-
mate to ask for consent in this situation, under what circumstances will
the driver's response be sufficient to constitute voluntary consent.154
The concurrence explained that the majority opinions in both the
George and Dezso cases were attempting to deal with increasing law en-155
forcement techniques aimed at obtaining consent from motorists andS 156
others. The concurrence noted that the court's obligation is "to do
what we can, in our limited role as a court of last resort, to provide rea-
sonable protection to those [liberty and privacy] interests." 57
The concurrence warned further that in its role as protector of citi-
zens' constitutional interests, the court should provide reasonable protec-
tions against involuntary consent searches in the future, but could not ar-• 158
ticulate exactly how this would be accomplished. For the time being,
154. George, 557 N.W.2d at 581 (TomljanovichJ., concurring)).
155. See id. One such technique is to inquire: "'You wouldn't mind if I looked
in the truck, would you?'" Id. If the subject responds with a "no" the officer will
conduct the search. See id.
156. See id. (Tomljanovich, J., concurring). Justice Tomljanovich expressed
concern that the training that law enforcement officers receive enables them to
obtain consent to search. See id. Justice Tomlanovich explained that such train-
ing is "similar to the training sales people receive in getting people to agree to buy
things they do not want." Id. And there are consumer protection laws, Justice
Tomljanovich noted, which protect consumers who give consent for items they
don't really want, such as vacuum cleaners. See id. at 581-82.
157. Id. at 582. The concurrence noted two other contexts in which the court
has offered such protections in the past. See id. (citing Ascher v. Commissioner of
Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that temporary road-
blocks violate the Minnesota Constitution which requires that the police have ar-
ticulable suspicion of wrongdoing before stopping a motorist) and Matter of Wel-
fare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting the Unites States
Supreme Court's test for determining when a person has been seized)).
158. See id. at 582. The concurrence suggests three ways this goal could be ac-
complished. See id. First, the court could reject altogether the concept of consent
to search in traffic stops and voluntary street encounters. See id. Second, the court
could require that all attempts by officers to obtain consent be tape recorded. See
id. Third, the court could require the officer to inform the subject that he or she
has the option of refusing to give consent to the search. See id. The concurrence
noted that the second option is the most plausible because it would merely extend
the court's decision in State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). See id. See
also infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Scales deci-
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the concurrence reasoned, the majority's heightened review of voluntary




A. The Need for Assurance of Voluntariness
In George, the Minnesota Supreme Court asserted that more assur-
ance of the voluntariness of consent is needed to validate a warrantless
search,1 0 and that subjects of consent searches need more protection than
is offered by the Schneckloth totality test. While the Minnesota Supreme
Court is not alone in this position, only two other states have decided to• 162
act upon this proposal. Despite the lack of support in state and federal
courts, commentators have long been concerned about the issue of volun-
tariness in connection with consent. 16  There are commentators that
agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that subjects of consent searches• 164
need more protection. The general consensus among commentators,
however, is not that consent searches should be prohibited altogether or
sion.
159. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 582.
160. See id. at 580.
161. See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 277 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the capacity to chose to relinquish the right to
be free from unreasonable searches necessarily depends upon the knowledge that
there is a choice to be made); William N. Mehlhaf, Note, A Valid Consent To Search
Does Not Require Knowledge of the Constitutionally Protected Right to Refuse, 9 GONZ. L.
REv. 845, 857 (1974) (suggesting that officers be required to apprise individual of
their constitutional right to refuse consent and of the consequences of waiving
that right); William A. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Held Not To Require That One Giving
Permission For a Consent Search Be Informed That He Has the Right To Withhold his Con-
sent, 7 IND. L. REv. 592, 595 (1974) (questioning whether consent to a warrantless
search can be truly voluntary if the suspect does not know he can refuse the
search); William R. Sage, Note, Standards for Valid Consent to Search, 52 N.C. L. REv.
644, 653 (1974) (noting that it is difficult to conceive of how a defendant who has
no knowledge of his Fourth Amendment right can be said to have chosen to forgo
these rights by consenting to a search); Eugene E. Smary, Note, The Doctrine of
Waiver and Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 891, 902-03 (1974) (suggesting
that the right to a fair trial, which is protected in other waiver situations, is lost
when items are seized following unintelligent and unknowing waiver of the right
to refuse consent to a search).
162. See State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975) (requiring the state to
prove consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is the knowledge of the
right to refuse consent); Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983) (holding that
the State failed to prove there was a voluntary waiver of the defendant's right to
refuse to be searched); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text for list of
states which continue to follow the Schneckloth totality test.
163. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
164. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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that police should record all attempts to gain consent.1 65 Rather, the main
thrust of commentaries is toward notifying subjects of their rights in re-. 166
gard to consent searches.
B. The Majority's Move Toward Assurance
Prior to George, the Minnesota Supreme Court already had enhanced
the protections afforded to subjects of consent searches, although in a167
subtle way. In the majority opinion in George, the court explained that
"[s]hort of rejecting the concept of consent to search in the context of
routine traffic stops," trial and appellate courts "can and should demand
sufficient proof in any individual case that the consent to search was truly• 168
express, clear and voluntary." While this may sound like the Schneckloth
totality test, this test requires more proof than suggested by Schneckloth. In
support of this requirement, George noted that Dezso demonstrates an ap-
propriate review: "Our opinion in State v. Dezso... illustrates one way of
doing just that, by subj ecting claims of voluntary consent in this context to
careful appellate review.
In actuality, the Dezso court analyzed the case using the Schneckloth to-, 170
tality test, as it has since State v. O'Neill. On its face, nothing changed in
the court's analysis in Dezso. Evidently, between its decisions in Dezso,
where the court used the Schneckloth standard, and George, where the court
again used the totality test but relabeled the Dezso test a "careful appellate
review," the court determined that subjects of consent searches need
greater protection.171
What this means for practitioners is unclear. The standard for con-
sent to validate warrantless searches is currently in a state of flux."' George,
165. See infra note 166 for commentary that suggests warnings be given to sub-
jects of consent searches; but see Stack, supra note 42, at 202-08 (suggesting that all
airport consent searches should be prohibited).
166. See, e.g., Barrio, supra note 18 at 233; Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on
Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 175, 191 (1991); William J. Stuntz,
Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761, 787 (1989) .
167. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
168. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1997).
169. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
170. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Dezso
decision. See also supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text for explanation of how
the court adopted Schneckloth in O'Neill.
171. The Dezso decision does not address the concerns raised in George, yet the
George concurrence states: "Our decisions in this case and in Dezso represent what I
believe will be an ongoing attempt to come to grips with the increasing use.., of
subtle tactics to get motorists and others to 'consent' to searches." George, 557
N.W.2d at 581 (Tomljanovich,J., concurring).
172. Prior to George, it was clear that the test for consent searches was volun-
tariness, determined from the totality of the circumstances.
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through its analysis of the Dezso decision, stands for the idea that Min-
nesota courts now require something more than is required under the
Schneckloth totality of circumstances. Instead, Minnesota courts now re-
quire a careful appellate review. Unfortunately, practitioners do not have
a clear picture of what more is required to satisfy this new heightened ap-
pellate review.
C. The Concurrence's Indication of the Future of Consent Search
The only way to protect consent searches, then, is to provide the re-
viewing court with something more than voluntariness demonstrated by
mere totality of the circumstances. 7 3 Justice Tomljanovich's concurrence
in George suggests three ways to accomplish this goal and thereby reaffirms
that the court is indeed heading down the road to change in the consent
searches. 7 4 The concurrence lays a roadmap to that change and provides
three avenues: one, prohibit consent searches in traffic stops altogether;
two, expand Scales and require that consent inquiries be recorded; and
three, inform subjects of their right to refuse consent. 175 Of the three, the
first is completely unrealistic, and the second is unnecessary and will not
be a panacea for the court's concerns. The third option is the most prac-
tical and appropriate.
1. Prohibiting Consent Searches in Traffic Stops
The majority's approach makes it sound as if the court is actually
considering rejecting consent searches altogether in traffic stops; the con-
currence solidifies this concern. Realistically, this should not even be a
consideration before the court.
When the majority mentions the possibility of prohibiting consent
searches in vehicle stop situations, it does so in reliance on an article writ-
176ten about consent searches in airport stops. The article posits the the-
ory that because of the nature of airport searches, law enforcement should
be required to have probable cause for airport searches. 177 Reliance onthis authority alone for the proposition that consent searches be banned
173. The focus of the analysis here is not to debate whether the Minnesota Su-
preme Court should add more protections to consent searches. The court has al-
ready indicated that it plans to do so. Rather, the goal of this Note is to notify
practitioners that the status of consent searches is changing and to consider the
options the court has suggested.
174. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
175. See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Minn. 1997) (Tomljanovich, J.,
concurring).
176. See id. at 580 (citing Stack, supra note 42).
177. See Stack, supra note 42.
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defies the significant benefits of consent searches in a variety of situations• . 178
beyond airport searches.
Consent searches are important to the administration of justice.'
Cases that involve traffic stops demonstrate the practicality of consent
searches. Often, there is no opportunity to get a warrant and no guaran-
tee that a judge will automatically be available if needed. i s Additionally,
if the results of the search come back clean, and there is no further need
to detain the motorist, that person can continue on his way, and the offi-
cer on her's.1s Because the basis underlying the request for the consent
to search often comes up at the last minute, were the officer required to
obtain a warrant, the evidence could be lost.i s2
Obviously, consent searches are an integral part of law enforcement,
not merely traffic enforcement. If the court is going to throw out consent
searches in traffic stops because of the intimidating and discretionary na-
ture of consent searches,1 13 then the court should prepare to prohibit all
consent searches for difficulty in securing voluntary consent.
Researchers theorize a "social phenomenon" whereby most people
"reflexively obey authority figures." 8 The discretionary and intimidating
aspects of law enforcement apply to all citizen encounters, not only those
that take place on a highway. The court cannot remove this unfortunate
but integral part of law enforcement by prohibiting consent searches in
traffic stops. Even commentators that support the reflex theory, as it re-
lates to consent searches, do not propose that the prohibition of consent
178. See Section II.B on the role of consent searches in law enforcement for an
explanation of the benefits of consent searches as an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.
179. See supra note 18 to 24 and accompanying text. Even the article the court
relies on for support in criticizing consent searches admits this notion.
Despite their theoretical problems, consent searches have played a
large role in law enforcement for over forty years and are not likely to
fade from the scene in the near future. Recognizing this, the next best
step ... is to demand that law enforcement officers advise a suspect of
his rights before eliciting his consent.
Stack, supra note 42, at 205.
180. See LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 611-12 (citing LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL.,
DETECFION OF CRIME 159 (1967)).
181. See Lochhead, supra note 11, at 777; see also supra note 24 and accompany-
ing text.
182. See, e.g., State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 1994) (stating that
the motorist "seemed to tilt his wallet away from the officer's view," which made
the officer suspect that the defendant was "'trying to hide something'"). In such a
situation, the officer may lose the opportunity to investigate suspicious activity if
required to get a warrant or establish probable cause.
183. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Barrio, supra note 18 (discussing how "obedience theory" re-
lates to consent searches).
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185
searches is an appropriate response to such concerns. Clearly, the first
suggestion made by the George concurrence is unrealistic.
2. Expanding Scales to Consent Searches
The second option that the concurrence suggests is expanding the
court's decision in Scales to consent search situations.186 Considering the
fact thatJustice TomIjanovich labels this option as the most plausible, it is• . .187
important to consider how the court arrived at Scales. Minnesota practi-
188
tioners are still adjusting to the court's decision in State v. Scales, where
the court, under its supervisory power, required that all custodial interro-• 189
gations be tape recorded. Although the effect of Scales is still being felt
by law enforcement across the state, practitioners should hardly have been
surprised at the decision. The court did its best to spell out the direction
in which it was headed in cases preceding Scales.
In State v. Robinson,99 one of the cases predating Scales, the court ad-
dressed the validity of a statement obtained after the defendant had stated191
he wanted an attorney. In a footnote, the court observed that such is-
sues "could be obviated if police interrogators would record all conversa-
tions with the accused relative to the accused's constitutional rights .... 19'
The court further explained that this "would afford the reviewing court an
objective record upon which to rule, rather than one based upon self-
serving or subjective assertions of the principals involved.,193
In State v. Pilcher,194 the second case predating Scales, the court rein-
forced its observation from Robinson, and explained that "[t]he present
case provides a stellar example of a dispute that could have been avoided
had the law enforcement officers followed our recommendation in Robin-
son."195 The court's kinder, gentler suggestion in Robinson disappeared
185. See id. at 215. Barrio suggests that given people's tendency to obey
authority figures, the appropriate change in consent search law is not banning
consent searches, but requiring law enforcement "to inform suspects of their right
to withhold consent upon requesting their permission to search." Id.
186. See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Minn. 1997) (Tomljanovich, J.,
concurring).
187. Id.
188. 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).
189. See Scales, 518 N.W.2d at 592. "The recording requirement is intended 'to
avoid factual disputes underlying an accused's claims that the police violated his
constitutional rights.'" State v. Schroeder, 560 N.W.2d 739, 740 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (citing State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 289 (Minn. 1995)).
190. 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1988).
191. See id. at 221.
192. See id. at 224 n.5.
193. Id.
194. 472 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. 1991).
195. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 333.
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with Pilcher, where the court blatantly warned practitioners: "In the future,
we urge that law enforcement professionals use those technological means
at their disposal to fully preserve the actual interrogation. Law enforce-
ment personnel and prosecutors may expect that this court will look with
great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these admonitions." 9
Finally, in Scales, the court stated that it was "disturbed by the fact
that law enforcement officials have ignored our warnings in Pilcher and
Robinson.",9 7 The court held that "all custodial interrogation including
any information about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all question-
ing shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded
when questioning occurs at a place of detention."' s
The decisions leading up to Scales are very important and applicable
to the issue of consent searches. In Robinson and Pilcher, the court made
obvious attempts to encourage law enforcement officers to begin tape re-199
cording custodial interrogations. Because practitioners were unwilling
to listen to the court independently, the court forced practitioners to hear
their message by requiring custodial interrogations be tape recorded. 00
This is similar to the current situation surrounding consent searches.
The George majority announced a subtle new approach to consent201
searches: a heightened appellate review. Moreover, the concurrence
noted the court's "ongoing attempt to come to grips with the increasing use by
state troopers and police officers of subtle tactics to get motorists and oth-
ers to 'consent' to searches."2 0 2 In drawing practitioners' attention to this
issue, the court is doing the same thing as it did in Scales:. attempting to
warn practitioners from bringing any other cases similar to George and
Dezso before them.
The Scales requirement was a change, but not an impossible task,
considering the requirement was to tape custodial interrogations. Were
this court to extend Scales to traffic stops, it would require law enforce-
ment organizations to equip their officers with recorders; all squads would
need tape recorders as well. The nature of consent searches in vehicle
stop cases makes it impossible for officers to predict when they will find it
necessary to ask a subject for consent to search. The consent inquiry may
take place along the road, in the subject's car, in the officer's squad car,
or somewhere in between. Essentially, the court would be requiring that
officers record every contact they have with motorists. This is not nearly
the custodial situation outlined in Scales.
196. 472 N.W.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
197. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
198. Id.
199. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
201. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Minn. 1997).
202. Id. at 581 (Tomljanovich,J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Additionally, a Scales recording requirement is not a panacea to the
court's concerns about the voluntariness of consent. In Dezso, the officer203
had the ability to both videotape and audiotape the encounter. The
video equipment was not able to record the activity within the squad car,
204and so could not provide any helpful information. Further, the audio
tape was not helpful because it could not provide any clarity on the physi-ro 205
cal interaction of the defendant and officer. The parties body language
is often a consideration and cannot be caught on audiotape. In its deci-
sion, the court focused largely on the officer's body movement.206
An expansion of Scales, which the court purports to be the most plau-
sible option, will not clarify the voluntariness of every consent search. It
will not remove the necessity for a finder of fact to consider the totality of
the circumstances. In Dezso, the audiotape was available for both the trial207
and appellate court's review. The trial court established there was vol-
unta 7 consent based on testimony from both the officer and the defen-
dant. The Minnesota Supreme Court found the consent was not given
voluntarily because of officer's actions and discredited the trial court's
findings. In this situation, the audiotape was not a clarifying factor in
and of itself. Therefore, a Scales requirement is not the best option to en-
sure the voluntariness of consent.
3. Informing Subjects of their Right to Refuse Consent
The third option presented by the George concurrence is to require
that law enforcement officers inform subjects of their right to refuse con-210
sent. Although the concurrence states that the Scales extension is the211
more plausible possibility, the court should consider this third option
instead as the most plausible, because it is more practical and appropriate.
The Minnesota Supreme Court would not be alone in this decision.
Two other state supreme courts, the only two which have strayed from the
Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test, found that the solution to
their similar concerns was to require that law enforcement officers inform
212
subjects of their right to refuse consent. The Mississippi and NewJersey
Supreme Courts resolved the issue raised in George by taking this next
203. See State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 878-79 (Minn. 1994).
204. See id. at 879.
205. See id.
206. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
207. See Dezso, 512 N.W.2d at 880-81.
208. See id. at 880.
209. See id. at 881.
210. George, 557 N.W.2d at 582 (TomljanovichJ., concurring).
211. See id.
212. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
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natural step from Schneckloth. In Penick, the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that the waiver had to be knowledgeable. 2 13 In Johnson, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court held that knowledge must be an element of waiver of
214
the right to refuse consent.
Commentators have also cited the need for extra protection in con-
sent search cases, and have found the needed protection in warning sub-
jects of the right to refuse.2 15 A common criticism of the consent search
doctrine is that "[t] he voluntariness standard for consent searches cannot
be squared with a fourth amendment that aims to protect all privacy,
whether law-abiding or not. 2 16  One commentator suggests that "[i]t
would be a simple matter to require police to give a standard warning be-
fore asking consent to search, in order to ensure that suspects know that
the request to search really is a request and not a command."
2 1 7
Assuming that the Minnesota Supreme Court is going to follow the
concurrence in George and add some kind of additional protection to con-
sent searches, an appropriate response to the court's concerns would be
requiring that officers give warnings before attempting to gain consent to
search. This option is very practicable and feasible. Providing a warning
would alleviate the court's concerns in protecting individuals, as well as
the need for law enforcement to operate efficiently.
Many Minnesota law enforcement officers are already informing sub-
jects of their rights by way of a consent to search form. Additionally,
there is no indication that a warning of the right to refuse consent would
significantly decrease the use of consent searches. Finally, providing the
warnings will most likely result in more valid search results because the
213. See Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983); see also supra Section
II.D for a discussion of Penick.
214. See State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (NJ. 1975); see also supra Section II.D
for a discussion of Johnson.
215. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
216. Stuntz, supra note 166, at 787. A common distinction is made between
waiver of rights in consent searches and other waivers because in consent searches,
the waiver need not be knowing, intelligent, or intentional. Compare Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1973) (holding that in consent search situa-
tions, the waiver of the right to be free from unreasonable searches need not be
made with knowledge of the right to refuse consent) with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding that a waiver of the right to counsel must be made
competently and intelligently).
217. Stuntz, supra note 166, at 787 (emphasis in original).
218. See State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 1992) (determining the
search to be invalid where defendant's mother signed a consent to search form for
the search of their home); State v. Hanley, 363 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Minn. 1985)
(concluding that the search was invalid where defendant's girlfriend signed a con-
sent to search form for the search of their home); State v. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d
227, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding search of defendant's home was invalid
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voluntariness of the search would not be as questionable as it is now.
D. The Court's Ability to Provide Extra Protection
There is no question that the court is ready to provide extra protec-
tions to subjects of consent searches. Moreover, there is also no question
as to the court's judicial ability to provide the extra protection. The court
has two distinct options at its disposal.
First, the court can utilize its supervisory power in extending the pro-
tections in consent searches. In Scales, the court did not make the record-
ing requirement under an express constitutional provision, but rather• •,,219
under its "supervisory power to insure the fair administration ofjustice.220
The court has used this function in other cases as well, so there is no in-
dication that the court would hesitate in using it in consent searches.
Second, in addition to its supervisory power, the court can act under
the Fourth Amendment. When it deems necessary, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has the ability to provide broader individual rights under the
Minnesota Constitution than are permitted under the Federal Constitu-
221
tion. More importantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has already
demonstrated its willingness to expand a defendant's rights beyond the
222
requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Under ei-
219. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (citing State v. Borst,
278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967)).
220. See, e.g., State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967)
(basing its decision on its "supervisory power to insure the fair administration of
justice" and holding "that counsel should be provided in any case, whether it be a
misdemeanor or not, which may lead to incarceration in a penal institution").
221. See State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 1986) ("[T]his court has
the power to provide broader individual rights under the Minnesota Constitution
than are permitted under the United States Constitution...."); see also Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (holding that each state has the ability to im-
pose higher standards on searches and seizures under state law than that required
by the United States Constitution).
222. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994) (holding that a de-
fendant is entitled to the protection of a recorded custodial interrogation); State v.
Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 1986) (acknowledging that the court had
the power to provide broader rights than those permitted under the United States
Constitution if it wished to do so).
State courts are bound by the United States Supreme Court in matters
of federal constitutional law. Not only may they not construe a federal
constitutional right more narrowly than mandated by the highest
court, they may not construe their own law, constitutional or otherwise,
in a manner inconsistent with federal constitutional standards. They
are not precluded, however, from interpreting their own law in a man-
ner which recognizes a broader protection than that minimally man-
dated for federal constitutional purposes. Such rulings would fall be-
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ther of the paths available, the court could and seems willing to expand
the protection offered to subjects of consent searches in traffic stops.
V. CONCLUSION
At this point, practitioners are beyond the point of debating whether
subjects of consent searches need extra protection. The majority in George
has already suggested that the totality of the circumstances test is not
enough to ensure the voluntariness of consent. The court has indicated
that it will now review consent searches under a heightened standard of
appellate review. The issue presently facing practitioners, then, is how to
satisfy this heightened review, and what more will have to be offered the
court in response to the court's concerns. Practitioners should keep Scales
in mind. The court makes its concerns about the voluntariness of con-
sent, particularly in traffic stops, very clear to practitioners. A Scales re-
quirement would not be the best solution to the consent search problems
the court has identified. However, if practitioners give the court the as-
surance it is looking for by informing subjects of their right to refuse con-
sent, perhaps the court's concerns will be alleviated without the necessity
of attaching a Scales requirement to consent searches or prohibiting con-
sent searches in traffics stops altogether.
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